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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is vested in the Supreme
Court of the. State of Utah, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated,
§78-2-2(3)(j) (Suppr 1992), which states:
(3)
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any
court of record, which the Court of Appeals does
not have original appellate jurisdiction.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD
OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did

the

trial

court

error

by

permitting

the

plaintiff to proceed on different claims, when such claims
were first presented to the court at the time of trial when no
prior request to amend the pleadings had been made by
plaintiff and defendant/appellant objected to such amendment
at such late date.
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW

Where the lower court is given broad

discretion to permit leave to amend pleadings, the Appellate
Court does not disturb such ruling unless the appellant
establishes an abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice to
appellant.

Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P2d 817 (Utah App.,

1988).
2.

Did the District Court error in making an equitable

determination that a constructive trust exists and that the
existence of such constructive trust was established by clear
and convincing evidence.
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW

Where the District Court is making an
1

equitable determination, it is the duty of the Supreme Court
on appeal of an equity case to weigh the facts as well as to
review the law.

Jensen v. Brown, 639 P2d 150 (Utah, 1981)

Reed v. Alvey 619 P2d 1374 (Utah, 1980); Matter of Hock's
Estate, 655 P2d 1111 (Utah, 1982); Adams v. Gubler, 731 P2d
494 (Utah, 1986).
It is further the duty and prerogative of the Supreme
Court to review both the law and the facts and to consider the
weight and sufficiency of the evidence where the proceeding to
be reviewed is in equity and is an attempt to establish an
interest in land where legal title is vested in another.
Richens v. Struhs, 412 P2d 314 (Utah, 1966).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES AND RULES
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes or rules
which are applicable and determinative of the issues presented
in this case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The plaintiff/appellee herein commenced a quiet title
action on or about August 1, 1986, alleging a fraudulent deed
and/or invalid delivery. (R.

1-5)

Subsequent to the death of the plaintiff/appellee, Larry
Wintle, was substituted as plaintiff in the above entitled
matter by order of the court, dated April 21, 1988. (R. 21)
The matter came on regularly for trial before the Honorable
David E. Roth on the 18th day of March, 1991, at which time
the plaintiff/appellee herein presented its case, under an
2

amended

claim

(TR.

defendant/appellant

3-5)

despite

objection

by

(TR. 5-6).

The court declared that it was not going to decide this
case without seeing the deposition of the decedent, Juanita
Wintle (TR.

54) and at the conclusion of the case reserved

ruling on motions pending submission of the deposition (TR.
97-99).
After receiving the unsigned original deposition of
Juanita Wintle, the court issued a Memorandum Decision dated
February 13, 1992, finding a constructive trust was created
and each of Juanita Wintle's four (4) children were entitled
to an equal share of this parcel of real property.

(R. 91-

93)
Judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant was entered by the court on or about March 31, 1992,
(R.

111-112) from which the defendant filed the instant

appeal on the 29th day of April, 1992. (R.

114)

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff, Juanita Wintle, filed a Quit Claim Deed
with the Weber County Recorder's Office on July 9, 1979,
wherein Juanita Wintle, did quit claim to Juanita Wintle and
Georgia Carbajal as joints tenants with full rights of
survivorship, certain real property located in Weber County,
State of Utah.

(R. 75)

This action was commenced by non-verified Complaint on
August 1, 1986, alleging same to be a quiet title action based
3

upon a fraudulent deed or delivery.

(R.

Additionally, a Lis Pendens was

1-5)
signed, filed and

recorded on November 3, 1986, by plaintiff's attorney, Douglas
M. Durbano.

(R. 70)

After the defendant/appellant herein, filed an Answer to
plaintiff's Complaint on September 15, 1986, (R.

8) the

plaintiff's own deposition was scheduled through her attorney
(R.

10) for the 16th day of October, 1986.

(Dep. 1)

Other than the substitution of Larry Wintle and Brent
Wintle as personal representative, no discovery was undertaken
by either party, which is evidenced by the lack of any
documentation

in

the

file

showing

any

discovery

being

undertaken.
Plaintiff filed a witness and exhibit list and Notice of
Use of Loss of Deposition on or about March 4, 1991.
67) which

indicated

the plaintiff

intends

(R 66-

to have the

deposition retyped, published and used at trial on March 18,
1991 pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R.

64)

The above entitled matter did come on regularly for trial
before the Honorable David E. Roth, Judge of the above
entitled court, sitting without a jury on March 18, 1991, and
in

plaintiff's

opening

statement

counsel

indicated

the

plaintiff would be presenting evidence to show a purchase
money resulting trust or a constructive trust. (TR. 4)
Upon plaintiff presenting its opening statement and its
intent to produce evidence on amended claims, defendant
4

objected to the plaintiff proceeding upon such claims, five
(5) years after the lawsuit was instituted when such claims
had not been presented previously and defendant indicated
witnesses had been brought from the State of New Mexico on the
basis of plaintiff's Complaint. (TR.

5-6)

Plaintiff's counsel indicated it could proceed by virtue
of The Matter of the Estate of Hock, 65 P2d 1111, and the
court indicated that it would reserve ruling on the objection
since it did not have the Hock's case referred to by
plaintiff's counsel, (TR.

7) when in fact the Hock's case

does not discuss amendment of pleadings.
Brent Wintle, the substituted Personal Representative and
one of the four heirs of Juanita Wintle's estate testified to
a conversation between himself, Brent Wintle and his deceased
mother, Juanita Wintle, as follows:
She told me she was intending on doing that
and that Georgia would, at the time of her death,
divide the house up amongst all four of us, but she
wanted to provide Georgia with a place to live,
because she was divorced and had no place to stay.
(TR. 13)
The defendant objected to such testimony pursuant to Rule
601(c)

of

the

Utah

Rules

of

Evidence

related

to

trustworthiness and corroboration to which the court indicated
it would allow such statements and the weight to be given such
statements could be argued.

(TR.

14-15)

Brent Wintle further testified after six or eight months,
Georgia moved to an apartment in South Ogden and he did not
discuss any joint tenancy arrangement with his mother again,
5

until 1986, when Juanita Wintle wanted to sell such property.
(TR.

17)
Brent Wintle further testified that he did not know the

Quit Claim Deed had been prepared and recorded until 1986.
(TR. 24)
While Larry Wintle a son and heir to Juanita Wintle's
Estate was testifying and was asked a question relating to the
deposition of Juanita Wintle taken in October, 1986, the court
after defendant objected to Larry Wintle testifying to what
Juanita Wintle said in her deposition, declared:
The court: "Why don't I tell you right now I
am not going to decide this case, without seeing
that deposition."
Mr. Carmichael:

"I can get ..."

The court: "Finish the evidence. I am going
to see the deposition before I make a decision."
The plaintiff also called Georgia Carbajal Ferguson as a
witness who testified she felt it was in her mother's best
interest to keep the house in case of medical problems and
that older people are better off in their own homes unless
they cannot be there any longer.
Georgia

Ferguson, appellant

(TR.

60)

herein,

also

testified

Juanita Wintle told her she brought this lawsuit because of
her sons, and that she really wanted Georgia Ferguson to have
the house.

(TR. 61)

Georgia Ferguson also testified her mother, Juanita
Wintle, indicated subsequent to requesting the property back,
she didn't want it back any more.
6

(TR.

64)

Georgia Ferguson testified she was married on May 30,
1979 in Covingtonf

Kentucky to Truman Ferguson and she

remained with him in Carlisle, Ohio until November, 1979 when
they moved back to the State of Utah.

(TR.

62-63)

Defendant's marriage certificate was brought to court and was
stipulated to as May 30, 1979 by plaintiff so that it would
not be necessary for her to surrender the actual certificate.
(TR.

63)
The

defendant

further

testified

on

July

9,

1979,

approximately six (6) weeks after her marriage, which is the
date that the Quit Claim Deed was recorded, she was residing
in Carlisle, Ohio with her husband, Truman Ferguson and had
nothing to do with the recording of the Quit Claim Deed. (TR.
64)
At the close of the plaintiff's evidence, plaintiff
indicated Juanita Wintle's deposition would be available
within two months

(TR.

70) and the defendant-appellant

herein, motioned the court to dismiss plaintiff's complaint
because the allegations contained in the plaintiff's complaint
had not been established, and secondly, upon the basis that
the plaintiff had not met its burden of clear and convincing
evidence to establish either type of trust referred to in
plaintiff's opening argument. (TR. 71-72)
The court thereupon indicated it would take defendant's
motion

to

dismiss

under

advisement

by

virtue

of

the

"haphazard" way this case has finally ended up in court. (TR
7

72)

Defendant expressed concern with respect to how the

deposition testimony which was not presented at the time of
trial would effect defendant in presenting her case.

(TR.

72-73)
Sheila Willie was called as a witness by defendant and
testified as follows:
Q: When you say she told you about her kids
and her grandkids, what did she say?
A: Well, at one time when we were talking, she
told me that she did not want any of her other kids
having anything because none of them cared anything
about her, except for Georgia. And she was the
only one that ever did anything for her. She was
the only one there when she needed her.
Q: Okay, now when she was making this
statement there in the hospital, was she... in your
opinion, was she able to understand what she was
saying?
A: Yes, she knew what she was saying. She was
coherent. She knew. (TR - 76)
Ginger Millikan testified to a conversation in Easter of
1978, when Juanita Wintle had told her she wanted everything
to go to Georgia and her kids,

(TR.

80)

Larue Loock testified Juanita Wintle had told her she had
signed the property over to Georgia and that she wasn't going
to tell anybody about having done so.

(TR

82-83)

Georgia Ferguson then testified Juanita Wintle, with whom
she spoke to daily during her lifetime including when the
lawsuit was proceeding, told her before her deposition of
October, 1986, what she (Juanita Wintle) was going to say:
A: She said she was going to say that she put
it my name so the house did not go through probate
8

or something like that.
I think that's what
Larry... you know, I don't know anything about
probate myself so I am naive on it. She was going
to say she didn't know Ginger and Austin and Willy
Taylor. That she had only met them once. And
where she had spent a lot of time at their homes.
I said mother that is perjury, and you can't do
that. She said I have to because Larry is going to
be with me at the deposition and I don't want him
to be mad at me. (TR
90-91)
Defendant further testified Juanita Wintle after the
deposition stated that she would never sign the deposition
because she did lie on it.

(TR. 91)

During the trial, the Last Will and Testament of Juanita
Wintle was admitted as evidence without objection. (R 76-82)
Juanita Wintle provided in her Will:
"The personal representative of my estate
shall be reimbursed from my estate for any and all
legal and related expenses incurred in legal action
filed on my behalf entitled "Wintle v. Ferguson",
filed in the Weber District Court, Civil Number:
96935."
The Will also provided as follows:
1. INCLUDED PROPERTY.
It is my intent that
all of the assets of which I may be possessed at my
death, including all items of real, personal and
mixed property, including all insurance policies
which should be located with this Will, shall be
included in the estate contemplated by this, my
Last Will and Testament. (R
77-78)
Such Will was signed on December 17, 1986, and was
witnessed by Douglas M. Durbano, who was also her attorney in
this

proceeding

at

that

time.

Such

Will

was

signed

approximately one and one half months after the original
deposition was prepared for signature by Juanita Wintle and
such deposition was never signed by Juanita Wintle (Dep. 35)
9

and no explanation other than the explanation advanced by
defendant that she would not sign the Will has ever been
presented.
Plaintiff/appellee's

attorney submitted the original

deposition of Juanita Wintle on or about December 11, 1991,
approximately nine (9) months after the trial of March 18,
1991 (R.

104) and the court issued its Memorandum Decision,

dated February 13, 1992. (R. 91-93)
With respect to the unsigned deposition of Juanita
Wintle, (which was conducted on October 16, 1986) and which
was noticed for hearing through her attorney, (Dep«

4)

Juanita Wintle testified Georgia Ferguson lived with her for
approximately six (6) months and that she was living with her
at the time she signed the Quit Claim Deed, (Dep. 7) which is
contrary to the evidence because of defendant's marriage in
Kentucky.
Juanita Wintle also testified in her deposition she
remembered going down to the Weber City and County Building
and signing the Quit Claim Deed.

(Dep. 10)

Juanita Wintle also testified Georgia Ferguson did not
exert any pressure on her to prepare or record the Quit Claim
Deed.

(Dep.

16)

Juanita Wintle also stated she had told "the lady" at the
City and County Building that she wanted Georgia's name on the
deed with her and the Deed was prepared there in the City and
County Building that same day by the lady that was in charge
10

at the Weber County Recorder's Office.

(Dep.

17-18)

After such document was prepared, she indicated she
signed it and had it recorded.
Juanita Wintle testified additionally as follows:
Q: (Mr. Perkins) You knew at the time, didn't
you Mrs. Wintle, that when you put Georgia's name
on it, that when you died, it went to Georgia?
A:

No I didn't.

Q:

Now. •

A: I knew it would go to Georgia, but she was
supposed to, like a said, supposed to have sold it
and divided it equally. (Dep. 25-26)
Juanita Wintle was further asked the following questions
and gave the following responses:
Q:
That's not my question, though Ma'am. My
question is, if you would like me to repeat it, is
that you knew that you were signing a document that
put the property in your name and Georgia's name,
didn't you?
A:

Yes.

Q:
And you knew that it was being recorded
that day, because you signed it right there at the
county building, right?
A:

Yes.

Q:
And it is just that now. •. and at that
time you trusted Georgia?
Ai

That's right?

Q:

And now you don't trust Georgia?

A:

That's right.

Q:
But at the time you signed it and when
you signed it in 1979, at that time, you knew that
you were conveying it in Georgia's name?
A:

Yes.
11

Q:
And she didn't lie to you about anything
regarding you signing it, did she?
A:

No.

(Dep.

31-32)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant Georgia Ferguson asserts the lower court
committed error in allowing the plaintiff to proceed on
amended claims of action first presented at the time of trial.
Defendant asserts the trial court's decision to take
under advisement defendant's objection to proceeding on
amended claims and then rendering its decision after receiving
the deposition of Juanita Wintle some nine (9) months later
without considering the effect of allowing such different
claim

constituted

an

abuse

of

discretion

and

unfairly

prejudiced the defendant.
Defendant asserts the plaintiff, personal representative
of Juanita Wintle's estate, did not establish by clear and
convincing evidence the existence of a constructive trust. The
personal representative failed to establish the existence of
a

confidential

relationship

nor the existence of undue

influence, fraud or inequitable conduct by the defendant
herein which would justify reformation of the deed.
Additionally, the District Court made no finding of such
confidential relationship but based its decision upon the
unsigned deposition of Juanita Wintle who expressed an intent
to avoid probate by conveying the property to herself and the
defendant. Allowing the grantor, Juanita Wintle, through her
personal representative to attack and impeach her own deed in
12

the absence of fraud, duress, mistake or other proper conduct
attributable to the defendant, Georgia Ferguson constitutes
further error by the trial court.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
ALLOWING PLAINTIFF TO PROCEED UPON A NEW CAUSE OF
ACTION RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME AT TRIAL
The Utah Supreme Court in Girard v. Appleby. 660 P2d 245
(Utah, 1983) held where plaintiff on the morning of trial,
motioned to amend the Complaint comprising new and different
causes of action as follows:
Rule 15(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
permits the amendment of pleadings by leave of
court, and the Rule is to be liberally construed so
as to further the interest of justice. However,
the Rule is to be applied with less liberality when
the amendments are proposed during or after the
trial rather than before trial.
In Girard v. Appleby, cited supra, the Utah Supreme Court
upheld the lower court's refusal to allow such amendment where
such changes were a significant change in the cause of action,
were not consented to by the defendant, and no reason was
adduced for not timely moving to amend his claim prior to
trial. Girard's inability to state an adequate reason for the
untimeliness of the motion did not present a case where
"justice requires an amendment".
In Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Way, 753 P2d 507 (Utah
App., 1988), the Court of Appeals held the second part of Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure 15(b) is permissive and must be
13

looked

at

to

both

afford

the

privilege

of

presenting

legitimate contentions pertaining to the dispute balanced with
the adverse side having reasonable notice of the issues raised
and an opportunity to meet them.
Similarly, in Kelly v. Utah Power and Light, 746 P2d 1189
(Utah Ap'p. 1987) , the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the lower
court, which had denied plaintiff's request to amend his
complaint one week prior to trial where it had been pending
over three years and such request to amend within one week of
scheduled trial could have required a continuance which could
have prejudice consolidation in cases, specifically declaring:

In considering a motion to amend, the trial
judge must decide whether the opposing side would
be put to unavoidable prejudice by having an issue
adjudicated for which he had not time to prepare.
Bekins Bar V. Ranch v. Huth, 664 P2d 455, 464
(Utah, 1983).
In Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P2d 817 (Utah App., 1988) the
Court of Appeals held it could not say the trial court had
abused its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion to amend
her complaint on the morning of trial, declaring:
Generally, relief to amend is liberally
allowed in the interest of justice, but justice is
often uninterested in amendments alleging new and
different causes of action on the eve of trial.
See Staker, 664 P2d at 1190; Girard, 660 P2d at
248; Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 15(a).
The
amendment of pleadings on the eve of trial causes
great disruption to the legal process and is unfair
to an opponent who has conducted discovery, fully
prepared the case and scheduled trial time based on
the moving party's prior pleadings.
Nonetheless, there are certainly occasions
14

where justice excuses untimeliness. A motion to
amend raised shortly before or at trial, in
response to facts discovered subsequent to the
prior pleading, should be allowed if there is a
reasonable explanation for the delay in discovering
the facts and the amendment is not unduly
prejudicial to the opposing party.
In the instant proceeding, the plaintiff commenced her
lawsuit in August, 1986, and trial was not conducted until
March 18, 1991, and the decedent's unsigned deposition was not
presented until December 11, 1991 and plaintiff had made no
motion to amend its pleadings until the morning of trial when
plaintiffs counsel suggested its evidence would show the
existence of a constructive and/or purchase money resulting
trust to the court.

(TR

3-5)

Defendant-appellant asserts the defacto permitting of
such amendment of plaintiff's pleading by the lower court
without

having

made

findings

upon

defendant-appellant's

objection to such amendment being made at trial constitutes an
abuse of discretion by the trial judge who failed to consider
"whether the opposing side would be put to unavoidable
prejudice by having an issue adjudicated for which he had not
time to prepare" as stated in Kelly v. Utah Power and Light,
746 P2d 1189 (Utah App. 1987).
II.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT A
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST WAS CREATED BY JUANITA WINTLE
Juanita Wintle, the decedent herein, in her unsigned
deposition dated October 16, 1986, gave testimony she knew she
was signing a document that placed the property in her name
15

and in the name of Georgia Carbajal, the defendant herein and
that she could not recall any misrepresentations being made by
the defendant herein.

(Dep. 31-34)

The defendant herein presented her marriage certificate
which indicated she was married on May 30, 1979 in Covington,
Kentucky and she and her husband, Truman Ferguson, remained in
Carlisle, Ohio, from that time until she returned to the State
of Utah November, 1979 at Thanksgiving and was not in the
State of Utah when her mother, Juanita Wintle signed and
recorded the Quit Claim Deed on July 9, 1979.

(TR.

64-65)

In Mattes v. Olearain, 759 P2d 1177 (Utah App., 1988),
the Utah Court of Appeals held:
A constructive trust is an equitable remedy to
prevent unjust enrichment in the absence of any
express or implied intention to form a trust. In
the Matter of the Estate of Hock, 655 P2d 1111,
(Utah, 1982). If the challenging party establishes
a constructive trust by clear and convincing
evidence, the trial court may alter a deed regular
in form and presumed to convey clear title. Ashton
v. Ashton, 733 P2d 147 (Utah, 1987).
A
constructive trust may be imposed if the grantee
was in a confidential relationship with the
grantor.
The Court of Appeals in considering what constitutes a
confidential relationship in the legal sense in Mattes v.
Olearain, cited for authority Webster v. Lehmer, 742 P2d 1203,
1206, wherein the Utah Supreme Court held:
The doctrine of confidential relationship
rests upon the principle of inequality between the
parties, and applies a position of superiority
occupied by one of the parties over the other.
In Hiltslev v. Ryder, 738 P2d 1024 (Utah, 1987) Justice
16

Zimmerman in a concurring opinion wrote:
"The burden of proof is upon the one asserting
a constructive trust to show by clear and
convincing evidence that equitable ground for
imposing a trust exists..." (citations omitted)
This burden cannot be met by simply showing that
there was a transaction between the parties
apparently for the benefit of one and that they had
a close family relationship.
In order to impose a constructive trust, in
addition to the family relationship, there must be
shown: [the grantor's] age and infirmity on one
hand, actual dominance on the part of the grantee,
an established course of management of the
grantor's affairs by the grantee, or other similar
facts making it inequitable to make the grantee to
prevail. Matter of the Estate of Coffin, 137 Ariz,
480, 482, 671 P2d 921, 923 (Ariz. Cr. App. 1983).
In VonHake v. Thomas, 704 P2d 766 (Utah, 1985), the Utah
Supreme Court declared the law does not lightly recognize the
existence of a confidential relationship and the law presumes
one would ordinarily make his own judgments however imperfect
and act on them.
Similarly in Webster v. Lehman, 742 P2d 1203, (Utah,
1987) Justice Durham in a concurring opinion wrote:
"Given the drastic consequences a finding of
the confidential relationship has for the parties
to a contract, we should be very careful in
defining the circumstances under which such a
relationship can be found to exist•"
Defendant-appellant asserts and testified that Juanita
Wintle told her she would not sign the deposition because she
had lied in parts of it.

(TR. 96)

Inasmuch as this lawsuit was commenced in 1986 (non
verified Complaint); whereas Juanita Wintle's deposition was
17

taken on October 16, 1986 with . Larry Wintle also being
present; whereas, the shorthand reporter subscribed her name
(Joanne Pratt) on the 30th day of October, 1986 to such
deposition and; whereas a Lis Pendens was filed by Attorney
Douglas Durbano on November 3, 1986; and whereas Juanita
Wintle signed her Will dated December 17, 1986 the Appellant
asserts

all

such

factors

lead

to

the

result' that

a

constructive trust was not formed in the instant proceeding.
Appellant asserts the sua sponte action by the Court
declaring it would read at a later date the deposition of
Juanita Wintle not knowing if it had been signed or the
circumstances surrounding the deposition not being signed, did
so without considering the factors enumerated in the preceding
paragraph and led to the lower court's erroneous result.
Appellant further asserts plaintiff who is in reality the
heirs of Juanita Wintle's estate did not establish by clear
and convincing evidence a constructive trust was created and
suggests the lack of further action by Juanita Wintle while
she was alive, supports the conclusion a constructive trust
should not be applied.
Juanita Wintle had

not divested

herself

from real

property in North Ogden, Weber County, State of Utah, but had,
by Quit Claim Deed, made herself a joint tenant with rights of
survivorship with her daughter, Georgia Carbajal Ferguson. (R.
75)

Juanita Wintle as a joint tenant could have severed the

joint tenancy by voluntary conveyance to a third party as
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provided in Tracv-Collins Trust Company v, Goeltz, 301 P2d
1086 (Utah, 1956) and defendant asserts that this lack of
action by the plaintiff during her lifetime, negates the claim
for a constructive trust.
Similarly, the Last Will and Testament of Juanita Wintle,
dated December 17, 1986, provided as follows:
The personal representative of my estate shall
be reimbursed from my estate for any and all legal
and related expenses incurred in the legal action
filed on my behalf entitled Wintle v. Ferguson,
filed in the Weber District Court, Civil Number
96935. (R 77)
Juanita Wintle's Will also provided:
"1. Included Property. It is my intent that
all of the assets of which I may be possessed at my
death, including all items of real, personal and
mixed property, including all insurance policies,
which should be located with this will shall be
included int he estate contemplated by this, my
Last Will and Testament. (R 78)
Defendant asserts such Last Will of Juanita Wintle signed
over four (4) months after this lawsuit was instituted and six
(6) weeks after her deposition was prepared for her signature
which was never signed by her does not indicate an intent to
change the status of the Quit Claim Deed conveying the real
property located in North Ogden, Utah to Georgia Carbajal
Ferguson, defendant-appellant herein.
In the instant proceeding, the evidence showed Juanita
Wintle7s health problems developed subsequent to her signing
and recording the Quit Claim Deed conveying the real property
to herself t*nd the defendant as joint tenants with right of
19

survivorship. The evidence also shows a lack of any dominance
being imposed upon Juanita Wintle by the defendant herein for
the defendant was residing in the State of Ohio when the deed
was recorded and had been so residing for approximately a
month and a half prior to Juanita Wintle going to the
Recorder's office and recording the Quit Claim Deed.
The Utah Supreme Court in Nielsen v. Rasmussen, 558 P2d
511, (Utah, 1976) provided the existence of a constructive
trust upon property must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence and such burden of proof must be shown to exist at
the time of the transfer and that a confidential relationship
existed at the time of transfer.
Defendant-appellant asserts there can be no finding of a
confidential relationship existing in July, 1979, when Georgia
Ferguson was residing in Ohio and Juanita Wintle recorded the
deed on her own volition which is necessary to impose a
constructive trust in this case.
In Barlow Society v. Commercial Security Bank, 723 P2d
398 (Utah, 1986) the Utah Supreme Court held:
"Absent fraud, duress, mistake or the like
attributable to grantee, competent grantor will not
be permitted to attack or impeach his own deed."
Desert Centers Inc., v. Olen Canyon, Inc., 11 Utah
2d 166, 356 P2d 286 (1960). As between the parties
a deed is good, with or without consideration.
Brown v. Peterson Development Co., Utah, 622 P2d
1175 (1980)."
In the instant proceeding, there is no evidence the
grantee committed any of those acts enumerated in Barlow
Society, cited supra, necessary for a grantor to attack her
20

own deed. Further, as between partiesf such deed is good with
or without consideration.
Consistent with Barlow Society v. Commercial Security
Bank, cited supra Bown v. Loveland, 678 P2d 292 (Utah, 1984)
held, for reformation of a deed the moving party must show
either a mutual mistake by the parties or a mistake by one and
fraud or inequitable conduct by the other party.

Neither of

these elements exist in this case and reformation of the deed
should not be permitted.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the above and

foregoing

arguments, the

defendant, Georgia Carbajal Ferguson, requests that this court
reverse the District Court granting judgment in favor of the
plaintiff and requests this court determine and declare
defendant-appellant to be the owner of the real property
forming the subject matter of this law suit.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this S ^

day of Auartt, 1992.

RONALD W. PERKINS
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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PROOF OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served four (4) true and exact
copies of the foregoing appellant's brief to Larrie Carmichael
at: 65 North 3700 West, #313, Hurricane, Utah 84737 on this

tT

day of August, 1992.
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IN THE SKCOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATK OK UTAH
LIS PENDENS

JUANITA WINTLE,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civi 1 I

GEORGIA FERGUSON, a/k/a
GEORGIA CARBAJAL,

HU^f

Defendant.
TO THE WEBf-R COUNTY RICORDKR:
NOTICE

IS HEREBY g i v m

and is now ponding
of

the

that an action has been corrunenccd

in the ahovo-ont\ 11 CM! Court on the Complaint

above-named

Plaintiff,

JUANITA

WINTLK,

against

the

above-named Defendant, GEORGIA FERGUSON, a/k/a GEORGIA CAPBAJAL,
for a Quiet Title action, etc., in regards to the real property
described as follows:
All of 1x51 19, Block r , LOMOND ACRES
SUBDIVISION, North Ogden City, Wfber
(onnty, Utah.
Property Address: 478 East 3050 North
North Ogden, UT. 84404
\

DATED this

)

day of August, 1986,

\ ' . ^-

DOUGLAS M. DURBANO
Attorney for Plaintiff
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Case No.
gg/yyjl
l^V
Date:
3-/^?/
Clerk's Initials
W-/

OF
ALICE JUANITA W. WINTLE
I, Alice Juanita Wintle, residing at 478 East 3050 North,
City of North Ogden, Weber County, State of Utah, at the age of
74 years old, having been born on February 24, 1912, being of
sound and disposing mind, and not acting under any undue influence or persuasion from any person, do hereby make and declare
this my Last Will and Testament.
ARTICLE I
Preliminary Provisions
1.

PRIOR WILLS.

I hereby revoke any and all wills and

codicils heretofore made by me.

I hereby declare that this will

shall not be revoked, amended or modified by another will or
codicil in whatever

form made unless such instrument is dated

subsequent to the date of this will.
2.

FAMILY STATUS.

I declare that I am a widow and not

married and that I have four (4) children, ("my children") whose
names, date of births, and addresses are as follows:
Name & Date of Birth
George Larry Wintle
Gloria Lee Crouch
Brent Albert Wintle
Georgia May Ferguson

Location

(11/28/38)
(11/28/38)
(04/04/40)
(05/24/43)

Ogden,
Perry,
Ogden,
Ogden,

Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah

iUJ26
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LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT
OF
ALICE JUANITA W. WINTLE

3.

PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE/GURARDIAN.

I hereby nominate and

appoint my son, George Larry Wintle, to serve without bond as
Personal Representative hereof.

In the event George Larry Wintle

shall, for any reason, be unable to so serve, I nominate and
appoint my son, Brent Albert Wintle, as Personal Representative
to serve without bond in the probate of my Last Will and
Testament.
reimbursed

The Personal Representative of my estate shall be
from my estate for any and all legal and related

expenses incurred in the legal action filed on my behalf entitled
Wintle vs. Ferguson, filed in the Weber County District Court,
Civil #96935.
4.

PAYMENT OF DEBTS, TAXES AND FUNERAL EXPENSES.

I direct

my Personal Representative to pay, as soon after my death as is
convenient, my expenses of my last illness, funeral expenses,
just debts, and any estate, inheritance, or other succession tax
payable by reason of my death, whether or not attributable to
property subject to this Will.
which

My instructions for interment,

should be followed, are attached to or located with this

Will.
5.

DEFINITIONS.

Whenever it shall be necessary to inter-

pret this instrument, the masculine shall include the feminine
and the singular the plural, unless the context indicates a
different intent.

The terms "children" or "descendants" is
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LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT
OF
ALICE JUANITA W. WINTLE

intended to identify

those children specifically named above,

also children conceived but not yet born, provided they are
hereafter

born

living, but does include adopted

children.

The term "spouse" refers to my present spouse, as named above.
If I am not married to the above named spouse at the time of my
death, this Will shall be void and of no effect.
ARTICLE II
Dispositive Provisions
1.

INCLUDED PROPERTY.

It is my intent that all of the

assets of which I may be possessed at my death, including all
items of real, personal and mixed

property,

including

all

insurance policies which should be located with this Will,
shall be included in the estate contemplated by this, my Last
Will and Testament.
2.

SEPARATE WRITING GIFTS.

I give and bequeath all of my

personal effects, including my wardrobe, jewelry, guns, sporting
equipment and similar belongings, and my household effects all of
which is personal property, other than money or securities, in
accordance with such written statement ot list as I may have
prepared

and signed prior to my death, pursuant to Utah Code

Ann. 1953, 75-2-513, which writing is in my own handwriting,
describing the property and to whom such is given and which is
signed by me and kept with this Will or elsewhere
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OF
ALICE JUANITA W. WINTLE

personal effects.

In the event that I have not prepared a

writing pursuant to this paragraph or to the extent that I have
not disposed of my household and personal property pursuant to as
separate writing, I direct that such household

and personal

property shall pass pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article.
3.

CONTINGENT GIFT/RESIDUE.

All property included in this

Will not otherwise disposed of shall be distributed in kind or as
cash from the sale of such property, if my Personal Representative should determine that it would be in the best interest of
the children to sell such property, as follows:
I give and bequeath to my children, to be divided equally
among and between them, per stirpes, all my remaining personal
and household effects, any automobile or automobiles, all real
property, and all other assets or interests which are property
included in this Will.
among

Such property shall be divided equally

them as they may agree.

If they cannot agree

among

themselves as to the division and disposition of such property my
Personal Representative shall divide such property into articles
or groups of articles and such persons shall then draw lots to
determine the order in which each shall select an article or
group of acticles.

After each has made a selection in the order

as determined by lot, the order of choice shall be reversed and
this system shall continue until all said property has been
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selected.

The division of such property into articles or groups

of articles made by my Personal Representative shall be binding
and conclusive with respect to all persons interested in my
estate.
4.

PRETERMITTED HEIRS.

I have in mind all persons who are

natural objects of my bounty.

Except as expressly provided for

in this Will, I have intentionally omitted to provide in my Will
for any person claiming to be an heir of mine.
5.

NON-CONTEST PROVISION.

If any person, be he or she an

heir, devisee, or legatee under this Will, or their successors in
interest, or any other person who, if I died intestate, would or
may be entitled to any part of my Estate, shall either directly
or indirectly, singly or in conjunction with other persons, seek
to set aside this Will, or attack, oppose, or seek to set aside
the probate of this Will, or to impair, invalidate,

or set aside

its provisions, or shall consent to, acquiesce in, or fail to
contest such proceedings, then in any or all of the abovementioned instances and events, I hereby give and bequeath to
such person or persons, the sum of $1.00 and no more, in lieu of
any other share or interest in my Estate.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I Alice Juanita W. Wintle, the
testatrix, sign my name to this, my Last Will and Testament which
consisting of

/^

type written pages, each bearing my initials,

LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT
OF
ALICE JUANITA W. WINTLE

on this

/ /jJL day of

>O^Cfewi.\o£v^-

'_,

19 % ? ,

and being

first duly sworn, do hereby declare to the undersigned individuals that I sign and execute this instrument as my Last Will and
Testament and that I sign it willingly, that I execute it as my
free and voluntary act for the purposes expressed in it, and that
I am eighteen

(18) years of age or older, of sound mind, and

under no constraint or undue influence.

^ ^ A L I C E JUANITA W. WINTLE

, the witnesses, sign our names to this
instrument, being first duly sworn, and do hereby declare to the
undersigned authority that the testatrix signs and executes this
instrument as her Last Will and that she signs it willingly, and
that each of us, in the presence and hearing of the testatrix and
of each other, hereby signs this Will as witness to the
testatrix±s signing, and that to the best of our knowledge the
testatrix is eighteen (18) years of age or older, of sound mind,
and \nder no constraint or undue influej

WITNE
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STATE OF UTAH
) ss:
)

COUNTY OF WEBER

SuJ>sf:ribed, sworn to, and acknowledged before me by

ma'-nfL- ft *

&

//jUy^^u^l

the Testatrix, and subscribed and

W/jL&Q
\ i m ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

sworn ^ o ^ b e f o r e ^ ^ by
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,
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JUANITA WINTLE,

t

DECISION

Plaintiff,
vs.
\

GEORGIA FERGUSON

Case No.

Defendant.

860996935

)1

The trial in this case case conducted on March 18, 1991.
At the conclusion of the testimony I determined that I could not
properly

decide

the case without

Juanita Wintle who was deceased.

reading

the

deposition

of

The deposition was provided to

me in December 1991, and a scheduling conference was conducted
on January 10, 1992, to determine if either attorney wanted to
have a hearing to present final arguments.

On January 16, 1992,

defendant's attorney advised me by letter that he did not see a
need

for oral argument.

plaintiff's attorney.

A copy of that letter was sent to

I have heard nothing from either attorney

since then and assume the case is submitted to me for decision.
Having reviewed the evidence produced a the trial and
having read the deposition of Juanita Wintle, I find and rule as
follows:

Decision
Case No. 860996935
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I find that the following facts have been proved by clear
and convincing evidence.
Juanita Wintle's husband died
sole possession

in 1976, leaving her in

of the home and property

in question.

Wintle owned no other property of significant value.

Ms.

Ms. Wintle

had four adult children.
In 1979, Ms. Wintle deeded her home to herself and her
daughter Georgia Ferguson as joint tenants.
not

pay

her

mother

anything

as

Ms. Ferguson did

consideration

for

this

transaction.
I find that it was Ms. Wintle's intention, in making this
transaction to avoid probate.
belief

that upon

her

It was also her intention and

death, the

property

would

be divided

equally among her children.
In 1986, Ms. Wintle wanted to sell her home so she could
move

to

a place

that

would

require

less maintenance.

Ms.

Ferguson would not allow her mother to sell the house and Ms.
Wintle then initiated this action.
Ms.

Wintle

executed

a

will

on

December

17,

1986,

directing that all her property be divided equally among her
children.

The will names her son George Wintle, as personal

representative.
Juanita Wintle died on June 3, 1987, and her son took
over the prosecution of this case on behalf of her estate.

Decision
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Georgia

Ferguson

property in question.

remains

in

sole

possession

of

the

Ms. Wintle's estate does not consist of

any other property of any significance.
Based upon the above findings, it is my opinion that Ms.
Ferguson
property.

will

be

unjustly

enriched

if

allowed

to

keep

the

I find that a constructive trust was created when Ms.

Wintle transferred the property to herself and her daughter and
that the intended result was that upon Ms. Wintle's death that
all her children would share equally in the property.
I therefore find that each of Juanita Wintle's children
is entitled to an equal share of the property in question.
Plaintiff

is

directed

to

prepare

documents

with this decision for my signature.
DATED this '

day of February, 1992.

consistent
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I

hereby certify that on the

N^

day of February,

1992, I sent a true and correct copy of the foregoing Decision
to counsel as follows:
Larrie A. Carmichael
65 North 3700 West #313
Hurricane, Utah 84737
Ronald W. Perkins
205 26th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401

/

uty Court Clerk

Indexed

LARRIE A CARMICHAEL (0580)
Attorney for Plaintiff
65 North 3700 West #313
Hurricane, Utah 84737
Telephone (801)635-0815

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JUANTTA WINTLE,
JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.

-b

\

H?#

#

GEORGIA FERGUSON, aka
GEORGIA CARBAJAL,

Civil No. 860996935
(Hon. David E. Roth)

Defendant.

This action came on for trial on March 18, 1991 (and was submitted for decision on
January 16, 1992), before the Court sitting without a jury, Honorable David E. Roth, District Judge,
presiding, Larrie A. Carmichael appearing a counsel for the plaintiff, and Ronald W. Perkins
appearing as counsel for the defendant, and the Court having reviewed the evidence produced at the
trial and having read the deposition of Juanita Wintle, and the Court having rendered its memorandum
Decision dated February 13, 1992, and the Court having made and filed its findings of fact and
conclusions of law, now therefore, upon motion of plaintiffs attorney, it is hereby

1
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Page
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ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1. Prior to June 7, 1979, plaintiff, Juanita Wintle, owned in fee simple a home and real
property located at 478 East 3050 North, North Ogden, Utah 84404, more particularly described as
follows:
All of Lot 19, Block 5, LOMOND ACRES SUBDIVISION, in North
Ogden City, Weber County, Utah, according to the Official Plat thereof.
(Serial No. 17-032-0019)
2. On or about June 7, 1979, Juanita Wintle, executed a Quit Claim Deed conveying
title to the home to herself and her daughter Georgia Ferguson, also known as Georgia Carbajal, as
joint tenants, which deed was recorded on June 9, 1979. A construaive trust in favor of Juanita
pintle was created when Juanita Wintle transferred title to the above described property from herself to
herself and Georgia Ferguson, also known as Georgia Carbajal, as joint tenants, and upon the death of
Juanita Wintle on June 3, 1987, title to the above described real property vested in her children
equally, namely, GEORGE LARRY WINTLE, GLORIA LEE CROUCH, BRENT A WINTLE and
GEORGIA MAY FERGUSON.
3. Plaintiff is awarded costs of Court agmnst defendant in the sum of $238.00.
DATED: March

. 1992.
BY THE COURT:

Approved as to form:
DISTRICT JUDGE
(No r e s p o n s e a s of

3-23-92)

Roland W. Perkins
Attorney for Defendant

JUDGMENT

2

CIVIL NO. 860996935

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This certifies that the undersigned mailed the foregoing Judgment for approval as to
form to the following this 9th day of March, 1992.
Ronald W. Perkins, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant
205 26th Street #34
Ogden, Utah 84401
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LARRIE A. CARMICHAEL
Attorney for Plaintiff
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CIVIL NO. 860996935

LARRIE A. CARMICHAEL (0580)
Attorney for Plaintiff
65 North 3700 West #313
Hurricane, Utah 84737
Telephone (801)635-0815

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JUANITA WINTLE,

)

Plaintiff,

)

vs.

)

GEORGIA FERGUSON, aka
GEORGIA CARBAJAL,

FINDINGS OF FACT
and
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

)

Civil No. 860996935
(Hon. David E. Roth)

Defendant.

This action came on for trial on March 18, 1991 (and was submitted for decision on
January 16, 1992), before the Court sitting without a jury, Honorable David E. Roth, District Judge,
presiding, Larrie A. Carmichael appearing a counsel for the plaintiff, and Ronald W. Perkins
appearing as counsel for the defendant, and the Court having reviewed the evidence produced at the
trial and having read the deposition of Juanita Wintle, and the Court having rendered its memorandum
Decision dated February 13, 1992, now, upon motion of plaintiff's attorney, makes and files its
findings of fact and conclusions of law.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Prior to June 7, 1979, plaintiff, Juanita Wintle, owned in fee simple a home and real
property located at 478 East 3050 North, North, Ogden, Utah 84404, more particularly described as
follows:

All of Lot 19, Block 5, LOMOND ACRES SUBDIVISION, in North
Ogden City, Weber County, Utah, according to the Official Plat thereof.
(Serial No. 17-032-0019)
2. On or about June 7, 1979, Juanita Wintle, executed a Quit Claim Deed conveying

title to the home to herself and her daughter Georgia Ferguson, also known as Georgia Carbajal, as
joint tenants, which deed was recorded on June 9, 1979. Plaintiff made a Lis Pendens dated August
1, 1986, in this case describing the above property and which was recorded November 3, 1986, in
Book 1502, Page 1498, as Entry No. 987744 of Official Records in the Office of the Weber County
Recorder, Utah.
3. The Court finds that the following facts have been proven by clear and convincing
evidence.
4. Juanita Wintle's husband died in 1976, leaving her in sole possession of the home
and property in question. Juanita Wintle owned no other property of significant value. Juanita Wintle
had four adult children, namely, George Larry Wintle, Gloria Lee Crouch, Brent A. Wintle, and
Georgia May Ferguson the defendant herein.
5. In 1979, Juanita Wintle deeded her home to herself and her daughter Georgia
Ferguson as joint tenants. Georgia Ferguson did not pay her mother anything as consideration for this
transaction.
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6. The Court finds that it was Juanita Wintle's intention, in making this transaction to
avoid probate. It was also her intention and belief that upon her death, the property would be divided
equally among her children.
7. In 1986, Juanita Wintle wanted to sell her home so she could move to a place that
would require less maintenance. Defendant would not allow her mother to sell the house and Juanita
Wintle then initiated this action
8. Juanita Wintle executed a will on December 17, 1986, directing that all her property
be divided equally among her children. The will names her son, George Wintle, as personal
representative. (Her son, Brent A. Wintle, is presently the appointed personal representative.)
9. Juanita Wintle died on June 3, 1987, and her son took over the prosecution of this
case on behalf of her estate. (The will has been admitted into probate in the Matter of the Estate of
Juanita Wintle, deceased, Probate No. 87-3916630 in this Court.)
10.

Defendant Georgia Ferguson remains in sole possession of the property in

question. Juanita Wintle's estate does not consist of any other property of any significance.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Based upon the above findings, it is the Court's opinion that defendant, Georgia
Ferguson, will be unjustly enriched if allowed to keep the property.
2. The Court finds that a constructive trust was created when Juanita Wintle transferred
the property to herself and her daughter and that the intended result was that upon Juanita Wintle's
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Wintle's death that all her children would share equally in the property.
3. The Court therefore finds that each of Juanita Wintle's children is entitled to an
equal share of the property in question.
DATED: March j T /

>

1992

BY THE COURT

E. ROTH
DISTRICT JUDGE

Approved as to form:

(No r e s p o n s e as of

3-23-92)

Ronald W. Perkins
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE QF MAILING
This certifies that the undersigned mailed a copy of the foregoing Findings of Faa and
Conclusions of Law to the following this J-j

day of February, 1992.

Ronald W. Perkins, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff
205 26th Street #34
Ogden, Utah 84401

(g^Z-c^f
r L.
LARRIE A. CARMICHAEL
Attorney for Plaintiff
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